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Fundamental Legal Conceptions and Other Legal Essays. By Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld. Edited by Walter Wheeler Cook. New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1923. pp. 420.
Walter Wheeler Cook has rendered a real service to our profession by collect-
ing in book form the writings of the late Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, for many
years his colleague in the Law Department of Yale University. The book takes
its title, Flndamental Legal Conceptions, from the first two of nine legal essays,
which, with a brief preface, an explanatory and appreciative introduction by the
editor, a table of cases, and a well-arranged index, constitute the volume. All of
these essays have appeared before, either in pamphlet form or in law publications,
and, as stated in the preface, the editorial work is confined to the insertion of
changes and additions indicated in manuscript notes left by the author.
The essays which give the book its name deal with the rather broad subject of
"Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning." Here the
author, in his own inimitable style, sets forth and elaborates the eight fundamental
conceptions, or "lowest common denominators of the law," as he at one point
expressively calls them, which, in his opinion, comprehend the essentials of all legal
problems; and these he states in the following terms and arranges thus:
4 right privilege power immunity
I no-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives 5 right privilege -power immunityI duty no-right liability disability."
Hohfeld was a practical theorist-as those who watched his all-too-short career
must realize-and the editor states in his introduction, to use the words of Mr.
Cook: "no one recognized more clearly than did Hohfeld that 'theory' which will
not work in practice is not sound. . . . 'Theory,' to which he devoted his life, was
to him a means to an end-the solution of legal problems and the development of
our law so as to meet the human needs which are the sole reason for its existence."
He saw that "the practical importance of accurate thought and precise expression,
as regards basic legal ideas and their embodiment in a terminology not calculated
to mislead," was not fully realized, and in these essays he made an able effort,
through reference to many examples of what he conceived to be incorrect uses
of familiar terms, to demonstrate how confusion of thought and statement had
crept into the field of law and how they might be avoided by the study and employ-
ment of his scheme of jural opposites and correlatives.
-Any attempt here to give an elaborate explanation of the Hohfeld system and
its practical application would be out of place; properly to understand and appre-
ciate its importance calls for a reading of his book, and this anyone interested in
the science of the law will find both enjoyable and profitable. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to say that the essays contain a careful analysis and
comparison in detail of the author's eight fundamental conceptions, in order "to
exhibit not only their intrinsic meaning and scope, but also their relations to one
another and the methods by which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the
solution of concrete problems of litigation."
It may be well to indulge in at least one quotation, from which a fair idea may
be gathered of the application of the author's thought. In treating of "powers,"
he writes: "It might be difficult, at first glance, to discover any essential and funda-
mental similarity between conditional sales of personalty, escrow transactions,
option agreements, agency relations, powers of appointment, etc.; but, if all these
relations are reduced to their lowest generic terms, the conceptions of legal power
[628]
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and legal liability are seen to be dominantly, though not exclusively, applicable
throughout the series. By such a process, it becomes possible not only to discover
essential similarities and illuminating analogies in the midst of what appears,
superficially, to be infinite and hopeless variety, but also to discern common princi-
ples of justice and policy underlying the various jural problems involved. An
indirect, yet very practical, consequence is that it frequently becomes feasible, by
virtue of such analysis, to use, as persuasive authorities, judicial precedents that
might otherwise seem altogether irrelevant. If this point be valid with respect
to powers, it would seem to be equally so as regards all other basic conceptions of
the law. In short, the deeper the analysis, the greater becomes one's perception of
fundamental unity and harmony in the law."
The weakness in an attempt to divide the law into any given number of funda-
mental conceptions, expressed in fixed words or terms, lies in the fact that the
meaning of a word so often depends upon the color given by its context. In the
typical language of Mr. Justice Holmes, "A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."
Toznre v. 'lnzier (1917) 245 U. S. 418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159. Then, again,
those in a position to know do not always agree about the inherent meaning or
scope of given terms; this is shown by Albert Kocourek's article on the Hohfeld
system in the ILL os LAw REvmv of May 1920, where that writer, while giving
to the author of the book now under review full credit for "originality and
ingenuity," disagrees with him as to both the significance and the arrangement of
several of the terms employed.
In Professor Hohfeld's table of fundamental conceptions, he necessarily makes
liberal use of the word "right," a word which Mr. Justice Holmes recently said is
a "constant solicitation to fallacy." Jackman v. Rosenbaum (192, U. S.) 43
Sup. Ct. 9. "Right" and many other such words require a context before we can
get their color; so it is difficult to arrange them in any scheme of opposites and
correlatives for universal or general use; but, whether or not we accept Hohfeld's
terminology, to obtain a clear view of his basic idea, and keep it in mind, will
certainly make for straight thinking and exact expression in working out and
stating the solution of legal problems. During the last quarter-century, the judges
of our appellate courts have had a superabundance of work, and the enforced haste
which this condition of affairs necessitates shows in their written opinions. One
who writes over-much on technical subjects tires of the monotony of certain
terms; he constantly seeks for synonyms, and, at times, satisfies himself with
words which seem apt, albeit not exact, to state his meaning. If one having an
important piece of legal writing to do would take time to think out the proper
terms for his fundamental legal conceptions and then stick to them, it would avoid
much confusion of expression. To this extent, at least, Hohfeld's suggestions can
be made of real value to both the judge and the advocate.
In addition to the essays on "Fundamental Legal Conceptions," which take up
only about one-fourth of the volume, the book contains articles on "The Relations
between Equity and Law," "Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases,"
"Nature of Stockholders' 'Individual Liability for Corporation Debts," "The
Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws," "Have American
Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the
Present Day?" and other matters of interest.
The essays on the "Relation between Equity and Law" are especially interest-
ing and valuable. The purpose that gave rise to the writing of 'these particular
articles was to take issue "with the thesis of such scholars as Professors Langdell,
Ames, Maitland, and Stone, that there is no conflict at all between substantive legal
and equitable doctrines, or, according to Maitland, only one or two possible
instances of such conflict," and Professor Hohfeld well sustains his views; but
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what lends the greatest value to this part of the book is a skillfully prepared analy-
tical synopsis, with supplemental notes, which not only gives the reader a concise
introduction to the subject of equity and its position in our legal system, but also
outlines in a masterly way the historical development of equity jurisdiction.
In his article on "Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases," the author
devotes thirty-three pages to a keen and searching investigation of English and
American decisions dealing with the subjects indicated, in order to demonstrate
what he conceived to be a serious error of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the case of Penman v. Jones (1917) 256 Pa. 416, ioo Atl. 1O43, and, incidentally,
the correctness of a rather elaborate dissenting opinion. Whether or not one
agrees with Professor Hohfeld's conclusions, the ability, learning, and power of
analysis here displayed command admiration.
The chapters on "The Individual Liability of Stockholders" and "Conflict of
Laws" in that relation, contain a careful analysis of the problems presented and
an excellent review of the leading authorities. The author's main proposition, on
the first part of his subject, is that "When all is said and done, a corporation is
just an association of natural persons conducting business under legal forms,
methods, and procedure that are sai geers" ; that such bodies must be so viewed,
if we are to have the advantages of exact thought on this important subject; and
it is "merely employing a short and convenient mode of describing the complex
and peculiar process by which the benefits and burdens of corporate members are
worked out," when we speak of their transactions in the corporate name. In other
words, stockholders are the constituent parts of a corporation much in the same
way as partners are of a co-partnership, their liability depending "on the legislative
enactment under which the association has transacted its business," and their
individual liability, to whatever extent it may exist, being "quasi-contractual rather
than contractual." On the second part of his subject-the conflict of laws relating
to the liability of stock-holders--Hohfeld takes, as a basis of discussion, a case
decided by the English courts a few years ago (Risdon Irm & Locomotive Works
v. Furness [19o5] i K. B. 304, affirmed .[I9o6] i K. B. 49), where an American
creditor sued a foreign stockholder to recover a debt contracted by an English
joint-stock company in California. Under the relevant American laws, a limited
individual liability existed, but not according to the English law, the courts of that
jurisdiction deciding against plaintiff's right to recover. While inclined to
disagree with the latter view, the author analyzes both the English and American
cases, in order, as he says, "to make plain the issues, to emphasize relevant
analogies, to suggest possible conclusions, and to bring together the various classes
of authorities believed to be more or less in point"; this, his main aim, he accom-
plishes in a very instructive and interesting manner.
' The greater part of the remaining pages are devoted to a dissertation on educa-
tion in the law. Hohfeld, who sought to make his profession not only learned
in name but in fact, proceeds to tell, from his own rich fund of information, how
this can be accomplished. In the first place, he would have the American universi-
ties found what he calls "schools of jurisprudence and law," for advanced
courses in (i) "The Systematic and Developmental Study of Legal Systems,"
(2) "The Professional and Detailed Study of the Anglo-American Legal System,"
(3) "The Civic and Cultural Study of Legal Institutions." These courses are
outlined and discussed in detail, the discussion affording the author opportunity to
state his ideas on many collateral subjects, such as the need for more liberal use
of legislation to keep the law up to date, instead of courts pursuing the habit of
overruling precedents; the strength and weakness of the stare decisis rule; the
duty of those in the law to fit themselves for the work of controlling the remaking
of institutions which is now going on all" over the world; and other matters of
vital interest. Through these higher schools of learning, Hohfeld would train a
force of professional jurists, fitted to serve as teachers, investigators, writers.
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judges, legislators, members of governmental commissions, etc.; and, as he well
says, "it would be difficult to overestimate the profound influence that a fairly
large body of jurists of this character would gradually be able to exercise for the
improvement of our legal system." The author's interest is not, however, wholly
centered on the education of jurists; he has much to say concerning the training
of the practising lawyer, and this he discusses under the heading of "The profes-
sional, or vocational, study of the Anglo-American legal system." Here Hohfeld
strongly advises the teaching of practical subjects to a greater degree than is now
followed in our law schools, particularly court and office practice and the drafting
of legislation and legal documents; but he chiefly urges courses which shall send
forth the coming American lawyer instructed in: (i) "Prescribed professional
courses in legal history and general jurisprudence," (2) "Prescribed reading
courses in the history of the legal profession, legal biography, legal ethics, and
general legal literature." Not content with telling what should be done, he tells
how, in his opinion, this can be accomplished.
The concluding paper affords an opportunity for some interesting reading on
the subject of trusts.
Finally, the volume is pleasing to the eye; it is systematically arranged, excel-
lently printed and well bound-considerations of importance to those who care for
books.
ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Legislative Procedure. By Robert Luce. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,
922. pp. vi, 628.
Lord Balfour once said that English politics were organized so that there
could be a continuous quarrel. Quarrelling is the rule in all American legisla-
tive bodies also, although it is, perhaps, more of a sham than in a system with
cabinet responsibility and a possibility of turning out the Government. Some-
times emotions run high and Marquis of Queensberry rules would not be inap-
propriate; but for the most part, the fight is carried on more irenically. The
antagonists beat each other over the heads with verbal bladders: there is a
maximum of noise and a minimum of damage. For this (now almost con-
tinuous) performance rules are necessary, and the procedural regulations of
legislative bodies form a technical maze which can be threaded only after much
study and with the aid of shadowy precedents. The layman rarely dares to
pry into this maze and even the legislator frequently loses himself in its mysteries.
Any issue of the Congressional Record will show the tyrociny of members and
the indecision of presiding officers as to the proper procedure to be followed.
Yet the importance of the rules can hardly be overestimated. Once a matter of
convenience and designed to secure order in an assembly where contradictory
aspirations struggle with one another, they are now too frequently weapons of
personal and party warfare. They may have as much influence as the constitu-
tion itself on the conduct of public business, and chambers do them equal
reverence.
Mr. Luce--who served in the Massachusetts legislature and constitutional con-
vention and is now a congressman from Massachusetts-has attempted, with
success, to make legislative procedure seem to the reader less mysterious and
more rational. The present volume is the first of an ambitious series of four
which will treat "historically, descriptively, and critically, the legislative branch
of government in every aspect." The author hopes soon to deal with legisla-
tive assembles, "their makeup and characteristics"; legislative principles, and
legislative problems. There would seem to be some overlapping-indeed, the
present volume on procedure encroaches somewhat on those to follow-but the
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subject is of such capital importance that it would be difficult to say too much
about it, especially when the sayer is himself a legislator. It is such analysis
and criticism that the literature of political science sadly lacks, for in order to
understand politics-and particularly such technical matters as legislative pro-
cedure-it is necessary to see it alive. It cannot be described from the study.
Mr. Luce's chief danger-to which the present volume occasionally succumbs-
is that he will substitute garrulity for analysis; that he will accept without
question the legislative branch of government in its present form, and that in
dealing with the (alleged) decline of its authority, he will ignore such matters
as the press, the development of extra-constitutional organizations, and the
growing complexity of legislative problems with an increasingly economic
orientation.
In this volume Mr. Luce is primarily concerned with more technical matters.
He discusses the beginnings of parliamentary law, the quorum, the initiation of
business, committees, the stages of legislation and amendments, restrictions on
debate, filibusters, reporting, voting, pairs, reconsideration, deadlocks between
two chambers, presiding officers, and legislative leadership, with particular refer-
ence to the powers of the speaker, steering committees, and the caucus. Mr.
Luce has read widely, so far as there is anything to read, in the history of
American state legislatures, and he illustrates his more important points
with a thorough discussion of general tendencies throughout the United
States. For comparative purposes there are brief references to Europe but this
material is sometimes not up to date. Recent changes, for example, in England
and France, make their old committee systems largely obsolete. As is natural,
however, Mr. Luce stresses the practice in Massachusetts and Congress. He
occasionally condemns certain state legislatures in rather cavalier fashion by
saying that their rules "seem incredible to one personally familiar with the
Massachusetts legislature," but his astonishment is justified. If, in dealing with
certain practices in Congress he is more tolerant than would seem necessary,
his justification may be that he, an experienced parliamentarian, sees more clearly
than the armchair critic just what the difficulties are that lie in the way of
improvement; and, in this respect, he is surely mre radical than most of his
fellow congressmen. He pronounces unhesitatingly against the antiquated
methods of calling the roll which result in the loss of so much time and he
says many sensible things about the detachment of the national house and
senate, which are malevolent neutrals rather than allied and associated powers.
Their committee system, with its double dose of seniority and mediocrity, does
not appeal to Mr. Luce who favors joint committees on the Massachusetts model.
This would prevent duplication and make for co6peration. Mr. Luce makes a
number of such suggestions and if he were given the authority to redraft the
rules, Congress would be a much more efficient body.
On two larger questions Mr. Luce is more hesitant and less sound. He
discusses the mechanics of law-making, partisanship, leadership, and coi5rdination
with the executive, but he makes few proposals for the improvement of a condi-
tion which, at present, is sadly in need of improvement. The most important
(and difficult) question is one of fact: who controls the House of Representa-
tives? One member of the House resigned recently for the reason, he said,
that "a half-dozen politicians do the legislating for the nation." That, of
course, states the matter much too simply. When Mr. Cannon was Speaker
there was not much doubt as to where leadership in the House of Representa-
tives was vested. There was even less doubt on certain occasions during Mr.
Wilson's administrations. Leadership of the House is now, apparently, in com-
mission. It is shared, that is to say, by the Speaker, the Rules Committee, the
Steering Committee, the chairmen of the most important legislative committees,
and the Committee on Committees. At least, so it would seem to an outside
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observer. But in what proportions? The requiem of the private member has
been sung in many legislative assemblies, but what were the time and the tune
of the congressional dirge? These are questions of grave importance, but Mr.
Luce answers them vaguely. He seems to dislike the caucus on the ground
that it ignores the minority, but even without a flourishing caucus, the minority's
rights are at present less than ever before. Mr. Luce is opposed to presidential
leadership but is not its only alternative congressional inefficiency? At all
events, the present leadership of the House of Representatives and its co~rdina-
tion or lack of co~rdination with the leadership of the Senate, give rise to one
of the most important problems of legislative procedure, and it is a problem on
which a congressman could throw a great deal of light.
The other question on which Mr. Luce is partly silent relates to the respec-
tive powers of the Senate and House of Representatives. "The Senate now
dominates," he says, and he gives a number of reasons: the longer term, the
executive functions, and the powers of the individual member. But why does
the House submit so tamely, and in respect of what matters is its submission
most frequent and important? The problem is a large one. Doubtless the House
of Representatives would be willing to resolve, in the language of the House of
Commons which was directed against George III, "that the power of the Senate
has increased, is increasing, and should be diminished," but the parcelling out of
power in a constitutional system is a matter of force as well as of words. With
an intelligent and efficient organization it might be possible for the House of
Representatives to reduce the influence of the Senate. One step in that direction
was taken recently when the House changed its rules in order to prevent the
Senate from putting riders on bills and forcing the House to adopt them as
part of conference reports, when the tacking was not permissible under the
rules of the House. The change in the rules seeks to allow the House a separate
vote on all such senatorial amendments and the Senate complains bitterly of
the practice. Perhaps additional changes in the rules would cause additional
complaints in the Senate.
It is permissible to call attention to these lacunae for, although they have
implications that are not procedural, Mr. Luce does give them some considera-
tion. He has, nevertheless, performed a real service in discussing legislative
procedure so clearly and learnedly. His volume will be of value to laymen,
students of politics, and even his fellow-legislators. That a member of the
American House of Representatives should have the ability and the inclination
to appeal to a wide and non-political audience on such a technical but important
matter, is as unusual as it is commendable. After all, the best way to improve




The Labor Injunction. By John P. Frey. Cincinnati, The Equity Publishers,
1922. pp. xiv, 197.
Some books have value as scientific treatises, others as presentations of a
point of view. The present little volume is of the latter class. It appears under
two union labels, printers' and bookbinders'; the author is editor of the INTERNA-
TIONAL M 0LDER'S JOURNAL; Mr. Gompers writes the introduction.
The book opens with a discussion of equity jurisdiction and its extension to
labor cases, stressing the very recent character of this development and the
dearth of British precedent. It discusses and opposes the "vicious" and "falla-
cious" theory that "business" is "property" (within the meaning of injunction
law) ; stresses the tendency of some or many cases to find justification in a
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business competitor's self-interest for prima facie torts for which a laborer's
group-interests are held no justification, and objects of this type of class distinc-
tion; and, in the specifically remedial field, attacks the use of the injunction in
labor cases because the wide split in the precedents makes a broad injunction in a
lower court possible, no matter what the views of the upper court may prove
to be; because the injunction as used has its full effect on the particular dispute
before its propriety comes on to be authoritatively tested; because injunction
terms are currently made so broad and indefinite as to make compliance almost
incompatible in practice with conduct of a labor dispute; and because contempt
proceedings are summary, juryless, and difficult to review. There are then
presented from the proceedings of the American Federation of Labor some
interesting excerpts relating to injunctions, and a series of cases designed appar-
ently to show both the uttermost lengths to which injunctions have been carried,
and what the author regards as the preferable view (especially the Allis-Chalmers
Case (i9o8, C. C. A. 7th) 166 Fed. 45). Particularly effective is the juxtaposi-
tion (pp. 129-139) of two lower court cases decided in Minneapolis and St. Paul
respectively, in 92o. "The class distinction which was established in these two
decisions is definite, for business men are held to be justified in boycotting while
the very reverse is held in the case of labor." The two decisions bear out the
point. This collection of cases is worth attention.
The author's text discussion suffers from a number of fallacious presupposi-
tions. He shares the curious conception that it was proper and fitting that law,
substantive and adjective, should grow and change perceptibly and far in times
gone by; but that at some undetermined though comparatively recent point
growth became. improper, unwarranted-a judicial usurpation. He shares the
unrealistic view that the Constitution, and in especial the Bill of Rights, means
to-day what its language seems to him to mean, rather than what the Supreme
Court has determined it to mean; and is misled into statements as to what
courts cannot do in determining rights, when they have already done the very
things in question. He confuses the substantive law of torts with injunction as
one possible remedy.
For all that, the book is valuable. It presents forcefully what one important
interest thinks, and how it comes to its thinking, in regard to the alleged abuse
of the machinery of the state to maintain the status quo between the employer
and the laborer. With all its misconception, it develops much solid ground for
that interest feeling itself aggrieved; (though to the reviewer much of that
same ground may appear inevitable in the process of social change). Its argu-
ment as to the existence of class discrimination in judicial practice bears much
thought. Its criticism of the use in labor disputes of the particular remedy
with which it deals may lack the literary vigor of Holmes and the technical
learning of Brandeis (as in their opinions in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U. S.
312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124) ; but it rings with sincerity, and it is sustained with points
not lightly to be brushed aside.
KaRL NIcrRsowN LLE WF.LYN
Yale University Law School
The Canadian Railway Act, x919, with Notes of Cases,-including the decisions
of the Board of Railway Commissioners respecting Telephone, Telegraph and
Express Companies. By Angus MacMurchy, K. C., and Shirley Denison, K. C.
Third Edition. By Angus MacMurchy, K. C., and John D. Spence. Toronto,
Canada Law Book Co., Ltd., I922. pp. Ivii, 798.
This is a new edition of the standard authority on Canadian Railway Law
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which since the First Edition appeared in 19o5 has, crede experto, proved of
inestimable advantage to the judiciary and Bar in Canada.
The Railway Law having been recast and recodified in 1919, 9 & io Geo. V,
c. 68 (Dom.), the Second Edition, 1911, while still very useful became less so and
a new edition was called for. While it is possible for a Railway in Canada to
be wholly within provincial jurisdiction, practically all are under the Dominion.
The very great importance of the (Dominion) Board of Railway Commissioners
of Canada is therefore apparent, and the authors do well in giving great
attention to the Board's jurisdiction, functions, practice, and decisions.
The control by the Board of Express Companies as well as of Telegraphs and
Telephones is clearly explained: these parts of the work cannot fail to be of
interest to the American Railway lawyer.
There is hardly a section of the Railway Act which has not been the subject
of one or more decisions-these decisions are all cited, in many instances quoted
and carefully discussed-the decisions of English Courts on similar legislation
are also cited, quoted, and discussed in the same way. In addition to British
courts there are references to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and the courts of Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont. I have tested the
accuracy of the citation in a number of cases and have found no errors.
The law and decisions are fully and fairly discussed by barristers of great
ability and experience, the book is well printed on good paper, the proof reading
is excellent; and this edition must prove as valuable as its predecessors, and
indispensable for anyone who desires to understand the Railway Law of Canada.
WILI&AM RFNwIcK RIDDEI.
Toronto, Canada
The New Constitutions of Europe. By Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay
Rogers. Garden City, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922. pp. x, 612.
This volume brings together for the first time English translations of the
new constitutions of Europe. It is divided into two parts. Part I, the Intro-
duction, deals with certain important problems of present-day government in
their relation to the new governments. These problems are discussed under
such suggestive headings as Princes and Parliaments; Legislatures and Bureau-
crats; Secondary Chambers; Segmentation and Federation; Proportional Rep-
resentation; Democrats and Diplomats; Individualism and Socialism. Part II
furnishes the texts of ten new European constitutions. Each is preceded by
an excellent historical note which gives a background for the document. There
is in addition a chapter dealing with the constitutions of Bavaria, Wfirttemberg,
and Baden. Five appendices to the volume contain the constitutions (with
historical notes) of Belgium, France, and Italy; a note on the recognition of
new states since 1913; and a reprint of the Bryce report on the House of Lords.
The ten new constitutions, the texts of which are given, are those of Germany,
Prussia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Russia, Poland, the Free City of
Danzig, Esthonia, and Finland. They are all carefully edited, and those of
Prussia, Austria, and Finland are translated into English for the first time.
The writers say in the Preface that written constitutions are but skeletons
of living governments; but they add, with truth: "An exhibit of skeletons
is not devoid of interest and of instructional potentialities; the veriest layman
can distinguish the frame of a quadruped from that of a biped, or the skull of an
ichthyosaurus from that of a man"; and there is no exaggeration in their claim
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that these constitutions "are indispensable first materials for any comparative
study of the remodeled political institutions of Europe."
Until there has been time for the written constitutions to take on the customs
and develop the conventions which are so influential in determining the char-
acter of a government, the most that commentators can do is to suggest the
apparent similarities to, and especially the divergencies from, the established
types of older governments. This the authors do in the Introduction. Quite
wisely they do not there present digests of the texts or detailed comparisons. For
the scholar digests are unnecessary when he is given the texts themselves; and for
the student they would be pedagogically less profitable than the opportunity
which is afforded him to make his own digests. More stimulating than long
comparisons are the suggestive discussions of some of the broader problems
with which the new governments are faced. The one criticism is that material
is given on other governments which has scant connection with the new
constitutions except that in a general way it furnishes information useful for
comparisons. Since much of this material is descriptive of the government of
England, the authors are perhaps justified in giving as their excuse that England
is the mother of parliaments. At any rate adequate treatment is given of innova-
tions in the new constitutions themselves, such as the German economic coun-
cils; and the thing is so well done that the tenuity of the unity will readily be
forgiven.
The book is thus something more than a convenient assembling of accurately
translated documents; it is a work of art. Woodrow Wilson, in one of his
essays, quotes Bagehot as saying that many books are meant to be studied,
but few are meant to be read. The volume under review is one of those excep-
tions which, though primarily intended for study, is also read with genuine
pleasure. It is graced with a quality which most American works on political
science utterly lack-that element of style which is as charming as it is subtle.
The very Preface-which in most books has no excuse for being except the
precedents of other poor prefaces-furnishes a relish which tempts the reader
to taste the meat of the book. And distinction in style is carried through the
Introduction, which is everywhere readable and in places brilliant. There
are not infrequent epigrammatic statements that are not usual in American
works on politics. It is said, for example, that the new Austrian constitution
"has no competitor for the post of primacy in the matter of anfractuous verbi-
age." We are told that "Two Emperor-Kings, five Kings, five Grand Dukes,
six Dukes, and Seven Princes-all reigning sovereigns under the old r6gime in
Germany and Austria-Hungary-lost their royal jobs as a result of the World
War." One of the differences between the French cabinet system and the Eng-
lish is epitomized in a phrase which characterizes the French Senate as "a
stabilizer of ministerial instability"; while an outstanding change in the German
government is summarized when the authors speak of the old "Bundesrat, now
sadly reduced to the status of a gesturing Reichsrat." The new upper houses
are called "not only second but secondary chambers." Not to multiply exam-
ples, we may note the significant assertion that at the moment that "common
good" which is the ultimate aim of forms and constitutions "may almost be
written 'common goods."'
Finally, it is of no little interest to add that the volume is attractive in form.
The footnotes, valuable in themselves, are not allowed to mar the continuity
of the pages. The marginal notes in the Introduction are inviting as well as
handy guides. The binding, type, and appearance of the page are pleasing to
the eye.
JAmEs HART
University of Michigan
